Mixed Feelings by Gibbs, Anna
This collection of essays aims to introduce
students of anthropology to that discipline’s
contribution to the interdisciplinary field of
work on the emotions. It should be said at the
outset that it is reviewed here by a non-
anthropologist who is unable to assess whether
it adequately represents the history of vicis-
situdes of thought about emotion in anthro-
pology, or the range of current anthropological
thinking on a topic which has emerged as a
pervasive concern across the humanities and
social sciences over the last decade. Having said
that, as a reader from another discipline I found
that the introductory essay by Maruska Svasek
gives a broad but useful overview of the history
of the main currents of thought about emotion
in anthropology, which she characterises as on
the one hand a European, broadly psycho-
analytic concern with kinship in which culture
is generated by ‘drives’ (e.g. Malinowski), 
and on the other, the US-based ‘culture and
personality’ mode with its strong interest in
developmental psychology (Benedict, Mead).
She delineates the differences between anthropo-
logical, psychological and sociological approaches
to the topic, and reads current moves in
anthropology as a shift from an emphasis on
discourse to one on embodiment. This in itself
entails an opening to disciplines beyond the
social sciences, and although the introduction
does not fully address this, it soon becomes
clear in what follows that anthropology is
beginning to do so, albeit in a way that strikes
this reader as somewhat erratic.
The opening chapter by Kay Milton elab-
orates on analytic effects across the disciplines
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mixed feelings
of the form taken by the western distinction
between nature and culture, and proposes an
‘ecological’ approach similar to that taken to
perception by J.J. Gibson as a way out of the
opposition between them.1 This would mean
paying attention to the specificity of an organ-
ism’s connection to its environment, which in
turn constrains what can be learned from that
environment. Milton draws on the psychologi-
cal work of Neisser (on memory) and Izard, on
Damasio in neuroscience and Scherer in sociol-
ogy to insist on the importance of emotion to
learning, and on the importance of learning in
interpreting the ‘same’ physiological responses
in different contexts. For example, a quicken-
ing heartbeat and tightening stomach muscles
may indicate fear, anxiety or love, depending
on whether one is contemplating a snake, an
exam, or a new lover. Milton implies, without
actually saying so, that the process of such indi-
vidual affective socialisation may then be
generalised so that we may imagine the pos-
sibilities of different forms of socialisation in
different cultures. Although I think she is
absolutely right about the need for this kind of
approach, I found it frustrating that I came
away with no concrete sense of what this might
be like in an anthropological study.
On the other hand, Lisette Josephides’s essay
later in the volume, on ‘Resentment as a Sense
of Self’, does give more of a picture of the pos-
sibilities here, though without actually claiming
her work as ecological. Revisiting old field notes
and realising that her subsequent writing did no
justice to the intensity of emotions she recalled
in the social life she describes, Josephides
reflects on the way in which her own emphasis
on pragmatism and political strategy conceals
the strength of felt resentment as a motivating
force in Kewa social life, and as a significant
shaper of Kewa selfhood. Describing resentment
as ‘weak person’s witchcraft’, she shows that fear
of provoking it provides an important check on
expressions of contempt and disdain, which
would be met with an immediate, violent
response. Critical of the cognitivism of Solomon
and others who view emotions as inter-
pretations, Josephides draws on Nussbaum,
Kant, Heidegger and others to argue that
emotions are motivating forces, expressive of
internal states, and, in Lutz and Abu-Lughod’s
formulation, they are ‘pragmatic acts and com-
municative performances’ that exceed dis-
course.2 But it is not clear to me whether she is
contending that emotions are simply likely to
give rise to certain kinds of action, or that they
are already actions in themselves. What is
clearer in her discussion is that emotions pro-
duce the self as both interiority capable of self-
reflection and agent seeking recognition in
the world.
Josephides describes the peculiar character
of Kewa resentment as anger with a very
specific source: an insult to the self. Any reader
familiar with the work of American psychol-
ogist Silvan S. Tomkins may wonder why she
doesn’t simply call it an angry response to the
experience of shame, for this is just what she
seems to be describing. Here anger, rather than
the complementary response of contempt, or
the equally conceivable response of distress, is
the culturally mandated response to potential
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humiliation and it is accompanied by certain
familiar behavioural repertoires whose pre-
dictability is surely central to their effectiveness
as threat.
In fact, I find myself often exasperated by
the fact that these essays often seem to retrace
arguments that Tomkins’s work has simply
outflanked—and then I wonder whether I am
not simply guilty of an over-investment in it
which may blind me to the questions it fails to
ask. Nevertheless, there is unquestionably a
strange silence around the name of Tomkins in
this volume, most obviously in Peter J. Bowler’s
essay, ‘Darwin on the Expression of the
Emotions’. Arguing that Darwin’s evolutionary
approach to the affects failed to be taken up
until Paul Ekman did so in the 1970s, which
provided an enabling context for renewed
interest in the biologically-informed study of
emotional expression, Bowler does not say that
Ekman was in fact one of Tomkins’s graduate
students and that his work is deeply indebted
to Tomkins’s in many respects, including his
theory of innate discrete affects. Bowler does
show in some detail that the reasons Ekman
offers for the contemporary resistance to
Darwin are anachronistic, and that it was the
ideology of evolutionary progress that posed
the major obstacle to the development of
Darwinian thought on the affects. By the time
Freud interests himself in Darwin, progression-
ism was being more widely challenged, and
anthropology and sociology ‘refused to privi-
lege European society as the goal to which all
others were moving’ (51), even if in psychology
behaviourism expelled biology altogether. This
actually makes Tomkins’s work—and its
absence from any consideration at all in this
volume—all the more remarkable, since he was
a psychologist who used psychology against 
the grain. Moreover, he carried out extensive
research (but not, as far as I know, actual field-
work) into affective expression and socialis-
ation in China and India. Though this work
was never written up for publication, Tomkins’s
notes are available (unsorted) in the History 
of Psychology Archives at the University of
Akron, Ohio.
My feelings of impatience with much of the
theoretical argument (though not the ethno-
graphy) in these essays derives from the fact
that, for all that talk of affect seems to be omni-
present these days, the development of affect
theory seems to have been forestalled by a
certain defensiveness about the project in the
face of local resistance in the social sciences,
which have tended to privilege particular forms
of rationality and to regard any approach to
thinking affect as marking a dangerous decline
into subjectivism. The social sciences in par-
ticular seem to have been drawn down the
dead end of a debate about whether emotions
are natural or cultural phenomena (often with-
out recognising that the distinction itself is cul-
turally produced), between a universalising,
essentialising biologism on the one hand and a
newer orthodoxy of cultural constructivism on
the other. Critiques of the former have become
second nature. The latter was extensively
critiqued as so ingrained as to be reflexive by
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank in
their introduction to Shame and its Sisters, the
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volume of writings that introduced the work of
Tomkins (marginal to psychology, although it
had been actively taken up by some contem-
porary psychotherapies) into cultural studies 
in 1995.3 Sedgwick and Frank proposed that 
it may be more productive to look beyond
familiar theoretical routines to what has now
become a rapidly burgeoning interdisciplinary
field in which biology in particular no longer
functions as the sign of essentialism, but as a
potential opening onto other ways of thinking
relations (including relations between terms
and relations) drawn from nonlinear dynamics
and systems and complexity theories. (If this
sounds a little like the structuralism of the
1960s, then yes, everything old is new again, as
it so often is in the history of thought.) This
coincides with a renewed interest in thinking
both cognition and memory as distributed
systems, neither fully localisable in the brain
(neurons, for example, also reside in the heart,
the gut, the knee, and so on) nor independent
of the sensory and affective systems which are
indispensable to them. Such a conception of
cognition implies certain things about thought,
including its partiality (in both senses of the
word) and its dependence on figuration.
‘The essential dynamic of unification in
theory construction, in science and in affect
theory construction alike, is error and incon-
sistency’, writes Tomkins.4 Such failures, essen-
tial though they are to further thought,
nevertheless give rise to shame, to an inter-
ruption or attenuation of ongoing interest and
enjoyment, rather than to its absolute rupture.
This is the pause that allows for reflection and
adjustment, which again makes possible
exchange and dialogue. Unless, that is, the
shame involved is too intense, and humiliation
generates rage: repeated sequences of shame
and rage (the ‘shame-rage spiral’, as it has been
called) fragments the self and makes thought
impossible. This suggests the need for modula-
tion of the shame we may inadvertently pro-
duce in others, and the importance of trying to
think in the face of shame, to think with shame,
rather than attempting to avoid it altogether.
Shame signals something in the dialogue that
requires attention. Anthropological fieldwork
inevitably generates shame in the distinction 
it instantiates between subject and object,
researcher and researched—a shame which
‘long-term participant observation’ can never
completely abolish, and which may indeed
generate its own further sources of shame, as
Jennifer Biddle has shown in writing about the
sudden trauma of a car accident and the death
that followed it, which shattered the routine
and ongoing traumatisation of such an immer-
sive experience as intensive fieldwork in a
remote community.5 So too she amply demon-
strates it in the writing of her story ‘Yarla’,
a trenchant fable about the responsibilities both
enforced and assumed by relations established
through fieldwork, which introduces her new
book on Warlpiri women’s art.6 But fieldwork,
of course, is also the strength of much contem-
porary anthropology, since it forces active nego-
tiation with one’s own shame and the shame of
others, of oneself as cause as well as site of
shame. It requires precisely the kind of nego-
tiation and exchange with the other that is the
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source of so much misery and misunderstand-
ing when it is refused or avoided out of fear,
habit, or shame itself.
The essays on fieldwork in this book dis-
appoint even as they do usefully inform the
uninformed about the parameters of the dis-
cipline. They tend to place the reader alongside
the writer in the position of relative mastery
afforded by professional knowledge without
rendering the crucial experience of not know-
ing, or something of the limits of understand-
ing. What is missing is the rendering of sensory
immersion in another culture, the experiences
of dislocation, surprise and tentative discovery
that require the poetic writing of a Lingis or a
Biddle, or the descriptive and narrative powers
of a novelist—perhaps even, at times, a comic
novelist. Elizabeth Tonkin narrates secondhand
an encounter that makes some of the immediate
difficulties of negotiation clear. A linguist in
South India asks a street vendor if he sells
cigarettes, and when the vendor slowly shakes
his head the linguist automatically turns away in
disappointment—even though he ‘knows’ that
in this cultural context the headshake means
yes. (56) Did the vendor ‘feel puzzled at the
customer’s rejection, or personally criticised in
some way?’, Tonkin wonders. When she writes
that ‘imagination makes real’ (58), one might
wish for more of it in the writing of these
essays, though perhaps the fault here lies less
with the writers than with the strictures of the
publishing industry which wants textbooks for
the largest possible number of large courses.
My own feeling is that students are more likely
to be excited by the way in which Jennifer
Biddle’s writing makes inventive use of a kind
of free indirect discourse in which Warlpiri
English and untranslated Warlpiri terms inter-
rupt and relativise the smooth taken-for-
grantedness manufactured by certain forms of
scholarly discourse, and in which structures of
repetition not usual in English (though their
use is doubtless inspired by Tomkins’s famous
concatenations) move towards elegy at moments
in her essay on death and trauma or mimic the
amplification of shame by positive feedback in
her essay on that the workings of that affect in
a very particular intercultural context.7
Like much of Biddle’s writing, Tonkin’s anec-
dotes testify to the somatically ingrained nature
of affective knowledge, but also make clear that
affects are cultured. The distinction between
affect and emotion seems to allow for a clearer
understanding of the corporeality of affect,
both the way in which affect is inevitably of the
body, and the way in which this means it feels
real. This is the essence of affect as a (or even
the) motivator in human life. Just as affect is an
interface between the self and the social, so too
it is an interface between consciousness and
what remains unconscious. We are only ever
partially in control of our own affective expres-
sion: we can communicate without wanting to;
we can dissimulate, but only with difficulty con-
ceal our dissimulation. Even the muscles we can
move voluntarily are dependent on the auto-
nomic neurons which function beyond the con-
trol of the neocortex (which we tend to imagine
as ‘higher’ intelligence, the locus of conscious-
ness in general and the will in particular). These
in turn respond to the environment (including
the social environment) which is itself not fully
separable from us but is partially brought into
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being by our movement in it as recent work on
vision by writers such as Francisco Varela or
Rudolfo Llinas makes clear. In Merleau-Ponty’s
succinct summation, ‘behaviour is the first cause
of all stimulations’.8 Affects are not local but
systemic responses which feed back into the
body and which are represented by it to itself
and to others. The feedback system extends
beyond the boundaries of the individual body
and is mediated by others and by cultural
amplifiers such as media. Affects produce
instant changes in the body’s chemistry and in
hedonic tone, all of which produces new dis-
positions in the world and readiness to certain
kinds of action (including further affective
response, and reflection) rather than others.
The same distinction also allows for certain
kinds of work to be done: it makes possible
studies of discrete affects rather than of a
generalised, encompassing, but essentially de-
materialised ‘affect’ in the singular; it gives us a
precise indication of how and where different
affects inhere in the body; it provides an affect
dynamics on the basis of the different neuro-
logical and physiological profiles of the dif-
ferent affects which then enables the tracing of
specific lines of force and their intersection
with other such lines, and it opens the way to a
study of the differential socialisation of the
affects and their (con)scripting in certain cul-
tural and social narratives. It also allows us to
think what the affective components of complex
and culturally specific emotional formations like
amae, song, or ressentiment may be, and to try to
grasp the immediate contagious and automatic
elements in the corporeal activation of these
formations, as well as that in them which is
learned and cultured as a form of social regula-
tion. Moreover, the distinction between affect
and emotion helps us think with more care
about the constitution of subjectivity both his-
torically and culturally, and the ways in which
different forms of subjectivity are enfolded with
the social and cultural milieu in which we
move, which shapes us and which we in turn
may shape. It allows us to analyse different
formations of social responsiveness so that
emotions can then be seen as the social and cul-
tural technologies of affect generating a range of
available behavioural repertoires.
It is crucial that the theory of discrete affects
be brought into dialogue with historical studies
of the emotions that periodise ways of thinking
about emotion and with those that focus on the
social regulation of affect at different times and
places, including the present, as Anand Pandian
recently pointed out.9 Kay Milton concludes
the volume under discussion by articulating
three questions to guide further research: how
do people in different cultures learn what and
how to feel about what; how do they learn to
perceive specific bodily sensations as particular
feelings; and how do they learn whether and
how to express or suppress those feelings?
These are important questions, and perhaps
they should have been the ones contributors
were explicitly asked to address, along with
developing explicitly the ecological approach
proposed by Milton. This is obliquely taken 
up in John Knight’s essay on the creation of
‘emotional affinities’ between monkeys and
humans in Japanese monkey parks, but an
opportunity is missed to theorise the approach
explicitly here.
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These, finally, are all interesting and worth-
while essays which all contribute to an exam-
ination of the ways in which the five emotions
Ekman and other post-Darwinian writers
broadly agree have a very high degree of inter-
cultural intelligibility (fear, anger, sadness,
enjoyment and disgust) are differently social-
ised in different cultures, and how they are
wrought into complex cultural emotional forms
and practices which don’t necessarily translate
into each other easily or at all—even if some of
these writers would not accept that view of
affect (as opposed to emotion) as innate. But
they do also testify to the ways in which affect
theory requires a sustained interdisciplinary 
(as well as disciplinary) endeavour, since the
location of affect at the interface of nature and
culture, self and the social, cognition and the
senses, means that it is inevitably constituted
differently as an object by a number of incom-
mensurable disciplinary knowledges. Some of
these disciplines, I would suggest, have also
produced problems that might dissolve or
which might appear otherwise if Milton’s eco-
logical approach were to be rigorously and
explicitly developed and it was possible to see
what difference such an approach actually
made in practice to the particular studies of
emotion presented here. Such an approach, it
seems to me, would challenge any absolute dis-
tinction between culture and the bio-physical
realm, and would want also to take account of
the different ways in which affect interfaces
with communications media (television, the
internet, dance, ritual, etc.) so as ultimately to
call into question the limits of ‘the human’
itself, to highlight its potential plasticity, and
something of its openness to the world that
both shapes and is shaped by it.
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